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Introduction
There is a type of organisation found in certain collectivities that makes
them into subjects in their own right, giving them a way of being minded that is
starkly discontinuous with the mentality of their members. This claim in social
ontology is strong enough to ground talk of such collectivities as entities that are
psychologically autonomous and that constitute institutional persons. Yet, unlike
some traditional doctrines (Runciman 1997), it does not spring from a rejection of
common sense. This paper shows that the claim is supported by the implications
of a distinctive social paradox — the discursive dilemma — and is consistent
with a denial that our minds are subsumed in a higher form of Geist or in any
variety of collective consciousness. Although the paper generates a rich,
metaphysical brew, the ingredients it deploys all come from austere and sober
analysis.
The paper is in six sections. In the first I introduce the doctrinal paradox, a
predicament recently identified in jurisprudence, and in the second I explain
how it generalises to constitute the discursive dilemma. In the third section I
show that that dilemma is going to arise for any group or gouping — henceforth
I shall just say, group — that espouses or avows purposes, and that such
purposive collectivities are bound to resolve it by imposing the discipline of
reason at the collective rather than the individual level. In the fourth and fifth
sections I argue that groups of this kind — social integrates, as I call them — will
constitute intentional and personal subjects. Then in the sixth and last section I
look briefly at how we should think of the relationship between institutional
persons of this kind and the natural persons who sustain them.
1. The doctrinal paradox
The discursive dilemma is a generalised version of the doctrinal paradox
that has recently been identified in jurisprudence by Lewis Kornhauser and
Lawrence Sager (Kornhauser and Sager 1986; Kornhauser 1992; Kornhauser 1992;
2Kornhauser and Sager 1993. See too Chapman, 1998a, 1998b; Brennan 1999). This
paradox arises when a multi-member court has to make a decision on the basis of
received doctrine as to the considerations that ought to determine the resolution
of a case: that is, on the basis of a conceptual sequencing of the matters to be
decided (Chapman 1998a) . It consists in the fact that the standard practice
whereby judges make their individual decisions on the case, and then aggregate
their votes, can lead to a different result from that which would have ensued had
they voted instead on whether the relevant considerations obtained, and let those
votes dictate how the case should be resolved.
A good example of the doctrinal paradox is provided by this simple case
where a three-judge court has to decide on a tort case. Under relevant legal
doctrine let us suppose that the court has to judge the defendant liable if and
only if it finds, first, that the defendant’s negligence was causally responsible for
the injury to the plaintiff and, second, that the defendant had a duty of care
towards the plaintiff. Now imagine that the three judges, A, B and C vote as
follows on those issues and on the doctrinally related matter of whether the
defendant is indeed liable.
  Cause of harm?     Duty of care?         Liable?
A. Yes No No
B. No Yes No
C. Yes Yes Yes
Matrix 1
There are two salient ways in which the court might in principle make its
decision in a case like this. Let us suppose that each judge votes on each premise
and on the conclusion, and does so in a perfectly rational manner. The judges
might aggregate  their votes in respect of the conclusion — the liability issue —
and let the majority view on that issue determine their collective finding. Call
this the conclusion-centred procedure. Under such a procedure, the defendant
would go free, since there are two votes against liability. Or the judges might
aggregate  their votes on the individual premises — the causation and duty
issues; let the majority view on each premise determine whether or not it is
collectively endorsed; and let the conclusion be accepted — that the defendant is
3liable — if and only if both premises are collectively endorsed. Call this the
premise-centred procedure. Since each premise commands majority support, the
defendant would be found liable under this procedure. The doctrinal paradox, as
presented in the jurisprudential literature, consists in the fact that the two
procedures described yield different outcomes.
Another simple example from the jurisprudential area is provided by a
case where a three-judge court has to decide on whether a defendant is liable
under a charge of breach of contract (Kornhauser and Sager 1993, 11). According
to legal doctrine, the court should find against the defendant if and only if it
finds, first that a valid contract was in place, and second that the defendant’s
behaviour was such as to breach the sort of contract that was allegedly in place.
Now imagine that the three judges, A, B and C vote as follows on those issues
and on the doctrinally related matter of whether the defendant is indeed liable.
Contract?        Breach?         Liable?
A. Yes No No
B. No Yes No
C. Yes Yes Yes
Matrix 2
In this case, as in the previous example, the judges might each conduct
their own reasoning and then decide the case in a conclusion-centred way, by
reference to the votes in the final column. Or they might decide the case in a
premise-centred way by looking to the majority opinions in each of the first two
columns and then letting those opinions decide the issue of liability. If they
adopted the conclusion-centred approach, they would find for the defendant; if
they took the premise-centred approach, then they would find against.
 The paradox illustrated will arise wherever a majority in the group supports
each of the premises, different majorities support different premises, and the
intersection or overlap of those majorities is not itself a majority in the group. The
fact that those in that overlap are not themselves a majority — in the cases
considered there is only one judge, C, in the intersection — explains why there is
only a minority in favour of the conclusion.1
4The doctrinal paradox is not confined to cases where a court has to make a
decision by reference to a conjunction of premises. It can also arise in cases where
the court has to make its decision by reference to a disjunction of considerations;
that is, in cases where the support required for a positive conclusion is only that
one or more of the premises be endorsed. This is unsurprising, of course, given
that a disjunction of premises, p or q, is equivalent to the negation of a
conjunction: not-(not-p and not-q). Still, it may be worth illustrating the
possibility.
Imagine that three judges have to make a decision on whether or not someone
should be given a retrial; that a retrial is required either in the event of inadmissible
evidence having been used previously or in the event of the appelants’s having been
forced to confess; and that the voting goes as follows among the judges (Kornhauser
and Sager 1993, 40):
Inadmissible evidence? Forced confession?      Retrial?
A. Yes No Yes
B. No Yes Yes
C. No No No
Matrix 3
This case also illustrates a doctrinal paradox, since the conclusion-centred procedure
will lead to giving the defendant a retrial and a premise-centred procedure will not:
at least not, so long as majority voting is all that is required for the group to reject one
of the premises (see Pettit 2001b).
2. The discursive dilemma
It should be clear that the doctrinal paradox will generalise in a number of
dimensions, representing a possibility that may materialise with any number of
decision-makers greater than two and with any number of premises greater than one,
whether those premises be conjunctively or disjunctively organised. But there are
other, perhaps less obvious ways in which it can be generalised also and I now look
at three of these. These give us reason, as we shall see later, to speak of a discursive
dilemma. I describe them respectively as the social generalisation, the diachronic
generalisation, and the modus tollens generalisation.
5The social generalisation
A paradox of the sort illustrated will arise, not just when legal doctrine
dictates that certain considerations are conceptually or epistemically prior to a
certain issue — an issue on which a conclusion has to be reached — and that
judgments on those considerations ought to dictate the judgment on the
conclusion. It will arise whenever a group of people discourse together with a
view to forming an opinion on a certain matter that rationally connects, by the
lights of all concerned, with other issues.
Consider an issue that might arise in a workplace, among the employees of a
company: for simplicity, as we may assume, a company owned by the employees.
The issue is whether to forego a pay-rise in order to spend the money thereby saved
on introducing a set of workplace safety measures: say, measures to guard against
electrocution. Let us suppose for convenience that the employees are to make the
decision — perhaps because of prior resolution — on the basis of considering three
separable issues: first, how serious the danger is; second, how effective the safety
measure that a pay-sacrifice would buy is likely to be; and third, whether the pay-
sacrifice is bearable for members individually. If an employee thinks that the danger
is sufficiently serious, the safety measure sufficiently effective, and the pay-sacrifice
sufficiently bearable, he or she will vote for the sacrifice; otherwise they will vote
against. And so each will have to consider the three issues and then look to what
should be concluded about the pay-sacrifice.
Imagine now that after appropriate dialogue and deliberation the employees
are disposed to vote on the relevant premises and conclusion in the pattern
illustrated by the following matrix for a group of three workers. The letters A, B, and
C represent the three employees and the ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ on any row represents the
disposition of the relevant employee to admit or reject the corresponding premise or
conclusion.
Serious danger? Effective measure? Bearable loss?Pay-sacrifice?
A. Yes No Yes No
B. No Yes Yes No
C. Yes Yes No No
Matrix 4
6If this is the pattern in which the employees vote, then a different decision will
be made, depending on whether the group judgment is driven by how members
judge on the premises or by how they judge on the conclusion. Looking at the matrix,
we can see that though everyone individually rejects the pay-sacrifice, a majority
supports each of the premises. If we think that the views of the employees on the
conclusion should determine the group-decision, then we will say that the group-
conclusion should be to reject the pay-sacrifice: there are only ‘No’s’ in the final
column. But if we think that the views of the employees on the premises should
determine the group-decision, then we will say that the group-conclusion should be
to accept the pay-sacrifice: there are more ‘Yes’s’ than ‘No’s’ in each of the premise
columns.
There are familiar practices of group deliberation and decision-making
corresponding to the conclusion-centred and premise-centred options. Thus the
group would go the conclusion-centred way if members entered into deliberation
and dialogue and then each cast their personal vote on whether to endorse the pay-
sacrifice or not; in that case the decision would be against the pay-sacrifice. The
group would go the premise-centred way, on the other hand, if there was a
chairperson who took a vote on each of the premises — say, a show of hands — and
then let logic decide the outcome; in this case the decision would be in favour of the
pay-sacrifice.
This example is stylised but should serve to indicate that the paradox is not
confined to the domain in which legal doctrine dictates that certain judgments are to
be made by reference to certain considerations. There are many social groups that
have to make judgments on various issues and that routinely do so by reference to
considerations that are privileged within the group.
One set of examples will be provided by the groups that are charged by an
external authority with making certain decisions on the basis of designated
considerations, and on that basis only. Instances of the category will be appointment
and promotions committees; committees charged with deciding who is to win a
certain prize or contract; trusts that have to make judgments on the basis of a
trustee’s instructions; associations or the executives of associations that have to
justify their actions by reference to the group’s charter; corporations that have to
7comply with policies endorsed by their shareholders; public bodies, be they
bureaucratic committees or appointed boards, that have to discharge specific briefs;
and governments that are more or less bound to party programs and principles. With
all such groups there is likely to be a problem as to whether the group should make
its judgment on a certain issue in a premise-centred or conclusion-centred way; it
will always be possible that those procedures will lead in different directions.
For a second set of examples consider those groups where it is a matter of
internal aspiration that members find common grounds by which to justify whatever
line they collectively take. Think of the political movement that has to work out a
policy program; or the association that has to decide on the terms of its constitution;
or the church that has to give an account of itself in the public forum; or the learned
academy that seeks a voice in the larger world of politics and journalism. In such
cases members of the group may not have access to an antecedently agreed set of
considerations on the basis of which to justify particular judgments. But their
identification with one another will support a wish to reach agreement on such a set
of reasons. To the extent that that wish gets to be satisfied, they will have to face the
issue, sooner or later, as to whether they should make their decisions in a premise-
centred or conclusion-centred way.
The diachronic generalisation
For all that has been said, however, the paradox may still seem unlikely to
figure much in ordinary social life. The reason is that whereas the judges in a
courtroom routinely have to make their judgments by reference to shared
considerations, people in other social groups will often reach collective decisions on
an incompletely theorised basis (Sunstein 1999). There will be a majority, perhaps
even a consensus, in favour of a certain line on some issue but there will be no
agreement among the parties to that majority or consensus on the reasons that
support the line. The parties will each vote that line for reasons of their own —
reasons related to their own interests or their own judgments of the common interest
— and there will only be a partial overlap between the different considerations they
each take into account. Thus there will be no possibility of their resorting to a
premise-centred procedure, let alone any prospect of that procedure yielding a
different result from the conclusion-centred alternative.
8But sound as this consideration is, social groups will still have to deal
routinely with the choice between these two procedures. In all of the examples so far
considered, the premises and the conclusion are up for synchronic determination,
whether at the individual or the collective level. Under the conclusion-centred
procedure, each person has to make up their own mind on the reasons they are
considering in premise position — assuming they do judge by reasons — and at the
same time on the conclusion that those reasons support. Under the premise-centred
procedure the group has to make up its mind on the reasons that are relevant by
everyone’s lights and at the same time on the conclusion that is to be derived from
those premise-judgments. But the problem of choosing between such procedures
may arise for a group in a diachronic as distinct from a synchronic way and is likely
to arise much more generally on this basis.
Suppose that over a period of time a group makes a judgment on each of a set
of issues, deciding them all by majority vote and perhaps deciding them on
incompletely theorised grounds: different members of the group are moved by
different considerations. Sooner or later such a group is bound to face an issue such
that how it should judge on that issue is determined by the judgments it previously
endorsed on other issues. And in such an event the group will face the old choice
between adopting a conclusion-centred procedure and adopting a premise-centred
one. The members may take a majority vote on the new issue facing them, running
the risk of adopting a view that is inconsistent with the views that they previously
espoused as a collectivity. Or they may allow the previously espoused views to
dictate the view that they should take on this new issue.
The courts will often face diachronic examples of the problem illustrated as
well as the synchronic examples that we considered; this will happen when previous
judgments of the court dictate the judgment that it ought to make on an issue
currently before it. But, more important for our purposes, even social groups that
differ from the courts in routinely securing only incompletely theorised agreements
will have to confront diachronic examples of the problem. They may escape the
synchronic problem through not being capable of agreeing on common
considerations by which different issues are to be judged. But that is no guarantee
that they will be able to escape the problem as it arises in diachronic form.
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The third and last point to note in generalisation of the doctrinal paradox is
that the options that we have been describing as the conclusion-centred procedure
and the premise-centred procedure are not exhaustive of the alternatives available.
The problem involved in the doctrinal paradox, even as it arises in legal and
synchronic contexts, has a more general cast than the jurisprudential literature
suggests.
The best way to see that the options are not exhaustive is to consider what a
group may do if it finds that, relying on majority vote, it endorses each of a given set
of premises while rejecting a conclusion that they support: say, deductively support.
One grand option is for the collectivity to let the majority vote stand on each issue,
thereby reflecting the views of its members on the different issues, while allowing the
collective views to be inconsistent with one another. This approach, in effect, would
vindicate the conclusion-centred procedure. But what now are the alternatives?
One possibility is for the group to ignore the majority vote on the conclusion,
as in the premise-centred procedure, and to let the majority votes on the premises
dictate the collective view on the conclusion. But another equally salient possibility,
neglected as irrelevant in the legal context, is to ignore the majority vote on one of the
premises, letting the majority votes on the other premises together with the majority
vote on the conclusion dictate the collective view to be taken on that premise. The
first possibility involves the collectivity practising modus ponens, the second has it
practise modus tollens instead. These two options can be seen as different forms of a
single grand option that stands exhaustively opposed to the first alternative
described above. Where that alternative would have the collectivity reflect the
individual views of its members on each issue, this second option would have the
group ensure that the views collectively espoused across those issues are mutually
consistent.
It should now be clear why I speak of a discursive dilemma rather than a
doctrinal paradox. The problem arises because of the requirements of discourse as
such, not just because of the demands of legal doctrine. And the problem represents a
hard choice or dilemma, not anything that strictly deserves to be called a paradox.
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The hard choice that a group in this dilemma faces is whether to let the views of the
collectivity on any issue be fully responsive to the individual views of members,
thereby running the risk of collective inconsistency; or whether to ensure that the
views of the group are collectively rational, even where that means compromising
responsiveness to the views of individual members on one or another issue. You can
have individual responsiveness or collective rationality but you cannot have both —
or at least you cannot have both for sure.
In arguing that the discursive dilemma presents groups with a hard choice, of
course, I am assuming that they will not be happy to avoid that choice by insisting on
voting by unanimity rather than majority, for example, since that would make them
unable to come to agreement on many pressing questions. And equally I am
assuming that collectivities will not simply refuse to draw out the implications of
their views, avoiding inconsistency by avoiding deductive closure. But I say no more
here on the general possibilities that arise in this area. Christian List and I have
argued elsewhere for a relevant impossibility theorem (List and Pettit 2001).2
3. Resolving the dilemma by collectivising reason
Any groups that seek to make deliberative, reasoned judgments, then, face a
dilemma. They may maximise responsiveness to individual views, running the risk
of collectively endorsing inconsistent sets of propositions. Or they may impose the
discipline of reason at the collective level, running the risk of collectively endorsing a
conclusion that a majority of them — perhaps even all of them — individually reject.
I show in this section that many groups respond to the dilemma by adopting the
second alternative — by collectivising reason — and I go on to argue in the following
two sections that groups which collectivise reason deserve ontological recognition as
intentional and personal subjects.
Groups come in many different shapes and sizes (French 1984). Some are just
unorganised collocations like the set of pedestrians on a given street, or the people
who live in the same postal area. Some are sets related in other arbitrary ways, like
those who have even telephone numbers or those who are first born to their mothers.
And some are classes of people who share a common feature — say, accent or
mannerism — that affects how others treat them but not necessarily how they behave
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themselves. Yet other groups are united by a commonality, due to nature or artifice,
that does affect how they behave themselves. It may affect how they behave towards
one another, without leading them to do anything in common, as with linguistic
groups, internet chat groups, and other enduring or episodic networks. Or it may
also affect how they behave, as we say, to a shared purpose.
Purposive groups come themselves in a number of varieties (Stoljar 1973).
They include organisations which have a specific function to discharge, such as
museums, libraries, trusts, and states, as well as more episodic entities like the
appointments committee or the jury or the commission of inquiry. And they also
include groups which do not have any one specific function but which are associated
with a characteristic goal, involving the outside world or the group’s own members
or perhaps a mix of both. Examples would include the political party, the trade
union, and the business corporation, as well as the small group of colleagues
involved in collaborative research and the set of friends arranging a joint holiday.
I argue in this section that purposive groups will almost inevitably confront
examples of the discursive dilemma and that, short of resorting to deception, they
will be under enormous pressure to collectivise reason: usually, though not
inevitably, to collectivise reason by practising modus ponens — as in the premise-
centred procedure — rather than modus tollens. In mounting this argument I shall
speak as if every member of a purposive group participates equally with others in
voting on what the group should do. I return to that assumption in the last section,
where I try to show that the argument can survive variations in such detail.
 My argument is in three parts. I argue, first, that a purposive collectivity will
inevitably confront discursive dilemmas; second, that it will be under enormous
pressure to collectivise reason in those dilemmas; and third, that in the general run of
cases it will collectivise reason by following the premise-centred procedure.
The first part of the argument can be formulated in these steps.
1. Any collection of individuals who coordinate their actions around the pursuit of a
common purpose — more on what this involves in the next section — will have to
endorse judgments that dictate how they are to act; these will bear on the
12
opportunities available for action, the best available means of furthering their
purpose, and so on.
2. The pursuit of such a common purpose will usually require explicit discussion
and deliberation about the judgments the collectivity ought to endorse — it will
not be like the activity of a tug-of-war team — so that over time the group will
generate a history of judgments that it is on record as making.
3. Those past judgments will inevitably constrain the judgment that the group ought
to make in various new cases; only one particular judgment in this or that case
will be consistent — or coherent in some looser way — with the past judgments.
4. And so the group will find itself confronted with discursive dilemmas; it will be
faced across time with sets of rationally connected issues such that it will have to
choose between maximising responsiveness to the views of individual members
and ensuring collective rationality.
This argument shows that discursive dilemmas of a diachronic sort are going
to be more or less unavoidable for purposive groups but it is consistent, of course,
with such groups also having to face synchronic dilemmas; I abstract from that
possibility here. The second part of the argument goes on to show that any group of
the kind envisaged will be pressured to impose the discipline of reason at the
collective level. It involves a further three steps.
5. The group will not be an effective or credible promoter of its assumed purpose if
it tolerates inconsistency or incoherence in its judgments across time; not all the
actions shaped by those discordant judgments can advance, or be represented as
advancing, one and the same purpose.
6. Every such group will need to be an effective promoter of its assumed purpose
and will need to be able to present itself as an effective promoter of that purpose;
it will lose any hold on members, or any respect among outsiders, if cannot do
this.
7. And so every purposive group is bound to try to collectivise reason, achieving
and acting on collective judgments that pass reason-related tests like consistency.
 How will a purposive group be disposed to collectivise reason? We do not
need to answer this question for purposes of the present argument. But it is worth
noting that two plausible, further steps argue that such a group will generally,
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though not of course inevitably, have to follow something like the premise-driven
procedure illustrated in our earlier examples.
8. The group will be unable to present itself as an effective promoter of its purpose if
it invariably seeks to establish consistency and coherence in the cases envisaged
by renouncing one or other of its past commitments: if it never allows its present
judgment to be dictated by past judgments; there will be no possibility of taking
such a routinely inconstant entity seriously.
9. Thus, any such purposive collectivity must avoid automatic recourse to the
revision of past commitments; it must show that those commitments are
sufficiently robust for us to be able to expect that the group will frequently be
guided by them in its future judgments.
The force of this three-part line of argument can be readily illustrated.
Suppose that a political party announces in March, say on the basis of majority vote
among its members, that it will not increase taxes if it gets into government. Suppose
that it announces in June, again on the basis of majority vote, that it will increase
defence spending. And now imagine that it faces the issue in September as to
whether it will increase government spending in other areas of policy or
organisation. Should it allow a majority vote on that issue too?
If the party does allow a majority vote, then we know that even in the event of
individual members being perfectly consistent across time, the vote may favour
increasing government spending in other areas. Thus the party will face the hard
choice between being responsive to the views of its individual members and
ensuring the collective rationality of the views it endorses. The members may vote in
the pattern of members A to C in the following matrix.
 Increase taxes? Increase defence spending?  Increase other spending?
A.     No Yes No (reduce)
B.     No No (reduce) Yes
C.     Yes Yes Yes
Matrix 5
But the party cannot tolerate collective inconsistency, since that would make it
a laughing-stock among its followers and in the electorate at large; it could no longer
claim to be seriously committed to its alleged purpose. And so it must not allow its
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judgments to be made in such a way that the discipline of reason is imposed only at
the individual level; it has to ensure that that discipline is imposed at the collective
level. In the ordinary run of things, the party will make its judgments after a
premise-driven pattern, using a modus ponens pattern. It may occasionally revoke
earlier judgments in order to be able in consistency to sustain a judgment that is
supported by a majority. But it cannot make a general practice of this, on pain of
again becoming a laughing-stock. It must frequently allow past judgments to serve as
endorsed premises that dictate later commitments.
This argument with the political party is going to apply, quite obviously,
to a large range of enduring and episodic collectivities. The argument does not
rule out the possibility that those groups will occasionally adopt another course.
They may choose to reject an earlier commitment in this or that case, for
example, rather than revise their spontaneous judgment on the issue currently
before them. Or they may even choose to live, overtly or covertly, with an
inconsistency. But it is hard to see how they could generally fail in these regards
and constitute effective or credible agents.
Instead of speaking of groups that collectivise reason in the manner of
these collectivities I shall talk from now on of integrations of people, of
integrated collectivities, and of social integrates. This way of speaking sounds a
contrast with those groups that do not reason at all or that do not impose the
discipline of reason at the collective level. These we naturally describe as
aggregations of people, as aggregated collectivities or just as aggregates. I go on
in the next two sections to argue that in an intuitive and important sense social
integrates are going to be intentional and personal subjects. I continue to assume
in this argument that members of social integrates all take an equal part in voting
on what those collectivities should do; I come back to that assumption in the final
section of the paper.
4. Social integates are intentional subjects
Are integrations of people likely to constitute intentional subjects,
displaying intentional states like beliefs and desires, judgments and intentions,
and performing the actions that such states rationalise? In particular, are
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integrations of people likely to constitute intentional subjects in their own right?
Are we going to have to itemise them, side by side with their members — if you
like, over and beyond their members — in any serious inventory of intentional
subjects?
In a well-known discussion, Anthony Quinton (1975, 17) maintains not.
He argues that to ascribe judgments, intentions and the like to social groups is
just a way of ascribing them, in a summative way, to individuals in those groups.
We do, of course, speak freely of the mental properties and acts of a group in
the way we do of individual people. Groups are said to have beliefs, emotions,
and attitudes and to take decisions and make promises. But these ways of
speaking are plainly metaphorical. To ascribe mental predicates to a group is
always an indirect way of ascribing such predicates to its members. With such
mental states as beliefs and attitudes, the ascriptions are of what I have called
a summative kind. To say that the industrial working class is determined to
resist anti-trade union laws is to say that all or most industrial workers are so
minded.
The position adopted here by Quinton amounts to a straightforward
eliminativism about collective intentional subjects. It suggests that only singular
entities can constitute intentional subjects — for this reason it might also be
called ‘singularism’ (Gilbert 1989, 12 ) — and that collectivities can be described
as subjects ‘only by figment, and for the sake of brevity of discussion’ (Austin
1869, 364).
One reason why the position described amounts to eliminativism is this. If
a collectivity can be said to form a certain belief or desire, a certain judgment or
intention, so far as all or most of its members do, then it would be misleading to
say that it constituted an intentional subject over and beyond its members. Asked
to say how many such subjects were present in a certain domain it would be
quite arbitrary to count the individuals there, and then to count the collectivity
also. We might as well count as subjects, not just the total set of people there, but
also every subset in which majority or unanimous attitudes give us a basis on
which to ascribe corresponding attitudes to that collection of people.
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This criticism suggests that Quinton tells too simple a story about the
attitudes that we expect to find on the part of individuals of whom we say that
they collectively judge or intend something. More recent work on the conditions
that might lead us to ascribe such joint attitudes, and to posit collective subjects,
has stressed the fact that we usually expect a complex web of mutual awareness
on the part of individuals involved (Gilbert 1989; Searle 1995; Tuomela 1995;
Bratman 1999). Thus Michael Bratman (1999) argues that you and I will have a
shared intention to do something just in case a) you intend that we do it and I
intend that we do it; b) we each intend that we do it because a) holds; and c)
those clauses are matters of which we are each aware, each aware that we are
each aware, and so on in the usual hierarchy of mutual knowledge.
Suppose we complicate the Quinton story in some such pattern, adopting
one of these mutual-awareness analyses. Will that undercut his eliminativism,
giving us reason to think that apart from singular subjects there are also
collective ones? It will certainly evade the criticism just made, for it will make it
much harder than Quinton does for a collection of individuals to deserve to be
described as having certain mental properties. But it will not avoid another
problem. It will not ensure that a collectivity displays the sort of rationality that
we expect in the performance of any system we would describe as an intentional
subject. So at any rate I shall argue.
What sort of rationality do we expect in an intentional subject? By a line of
argument that has been widely endorsed in recent philosophical thought, a
system will count as an intentional subject only if it preserves intentional
attitudes over time and forms, unforms and acts on those attitudes — at least
within intuitively feasible limits and under intuitively favourable conditions —
in a rationally permissible manner: in a phrase, only if it displays a certain
rational unity (Pettit 1993, Ch.1). If the system believes that p and comes across
evidence that not p, it must tend to unform that belief. If the system believes that
p and learns that if p then q, it must come to form the belief that q or to unform
one of the other beliefs. If the system desires that p, believes that by X-ing it can
bring it about that p, and believes that other things are equal, then it must tend to
X. And so on.
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Even if we introduce the sort of complexity postulated in mutual-
awareness stories about collective subjects, that will not guarantee that those
subjects have the rational unity associated with intentionality. Those stories are
all consistent with the collectivity’s acting by conventions that allow rational
disunity. The convention established in the mutual awareness of members may
ordain, for example, that the collectivity shall be deemed to judge or intend
whatever a majority of members vote for its judging or intending at that time.
And we know from discussion of the discursive dilemma that if such a
convention obtains — if the attitudes of the collectivity are required to be
continuous in that majoritarian way with the current votes of members — then
the collectivity may be guilty of grievous irrationality over time. It may be as
wayward in the postures it assumes as the most casual aggregate of individuals;
it may fail to materialise as anything that deserves to be taken as an intentional
subject in its own right.
In order for a collectivity to count as an intentional subject, not only must
there be a basis in the behaviour of participating members for ascribing
judgments and intentions and such attitudes to the collective; that is the point on
which the mutual-awareness literature rightly insists. There must also be a basis
for thinking of the collectivity as a subject that is rationally unified in such a way
that, within feasible limits and under favourable conditions, we can expect it to
live up to the constraints of rationality; we can expect it to enter and exit states of
belief and desire, judgment and intention, in a way that makes rational sense and
we can expect it to perform in action as those states require. Indeed, were there a
basis for ascribing such states to a collectivity, and a basis for expecting this sort
of rational unity, then it is hard to see any reason why we should deny that the
collectivity was an intentional subject in its own right.
How to secure the dual basis that is necessary for a collectivity to be an
intentional subject? The argument of the last section suggests a salient recipe. By
ensuring that the collectivity represents an integration of individuals, not just a
casual aggregate. Specifically, by ensuring, first, that the collectivity has a shared
purpose and forms the judgments and intentions associated with pursuit of that
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purpose; and second, that it collectivises reason in forming those judgments and
intentions.
I said and say nothing on what it is for a collectivity to form and have a
shared purpose, or to form and have certain judgments and intentions.
Presumably that can be analysed on something like the lines explored in the
mutual-awareness approach; it has to do, plausibly, with the conventions, and
the associated structures of common knowledge, that prevail in the collectivity.
Assuming that there is an established, conventional sense in which a collectivity
has a shared purpose, and forms associated judgments and intentions, the fact
that it collectivises reason in the course of that enterprise — the fact that it is a
social integrate — means that it will display precisely the sort of rational unity
required of an intentional subject. Let the collectivity have made certain
judgments and formed certain intentions in the past. And now imagine that it
faces a theoretical or practical issue where those judgments and intentions
rationally require a particular response. We can rely on the integrated collectivity
to respond as those intentional states rationally require, or to make rationally
permissible adjustments that undercut the requirements. Or at least we can rely
on it to do this under intuitively favourable conditions, and within intuitively
feasible limits.
The integrated collectivity has common purposes, and forms associated
judgments and intentions, unlike the collections envisaged in Quinton’s account.
And the integrated collectivity can be relied upon to achieve a rational unity in
the judgments and intentions endorsed, unlike the group that meets only the
mutual-awareness conditions for forming collective attitudes. It satisfies the dual
basis that is necessary for a collectivity to count as an intentional subject. But is
the satisfaction of these two conditions sufficient as well as necessary for the
integrated collectivity to count as an intentional subject, in particular an
intentional subject that is distinct from the individual subjects who make it up?
If we are to recognise the integrated collectivity as an intentional subject,
then we must admit of course that it is a subject of an unusual kind. It does not
have its own faculties of perception or memory, for example, though it may be
able to register and endorse facts perceived or remembered by others: in
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particular, by its own members. Under our characterisation it is incapable of
forming degress of belief and desire in the ordinary fashion of animal subjects; its
beliefs are recorded as on-off judgments, its desires as on-off intentions. And the
judgments and intentions that it forms are typically restricted to the narrow
domain engaged by the particular purposes that its members share.
Notwithstanding these features, however, I think that it is reasonable, even
compulsory, to think of the integrated collectivity as an intentional subject.
The basis for this claim is that the integrated collectivity, as characterised,
is going to display all the functional marks of an intentional subject and that
there is no reason to discount those marks as mere appearances. Within relevant
domains it will generally act in a manner that is rationalised by independently
discernible representations and goals; and within relevant domains it will
generally form and unform those representations in a manner that is rationalised
by the evidence that we take to be at its disposal. In particular, it will manifest
this sort of functional organisation, not just at a time, but over time; it will
display the degree of constancy as well as the degree of coherence that we expect
in any intentional subject. Why would anyone deny that an entity that displays
the functional marks of an intentional subject in this manner is not really an
subject of that kind?
One ground might be that intentionality requires, not just a certain form of
organisation, but also the realisation of that form in inherently mental material,
whatever that is thought to be. Few would endorse this consideration among
contemporary thinkers, however, since there appears to be nothing inherently
mental about the biological material out of which our individual minds are
fashioned (but see Searle 1983). Another ground for the denial might be that the
functional marks of intentional subjectivity have to come about as a result of the
subject’s internal organisation, and not in virtue of some form of remote control
or advance rigging (Jackson 1992). But this is hardly relevant to the integrated
collectivity, since its judgments and intentions are clearly formed in the required,
internal fashion. Still another sort of ground for denying that functional
organisation is sufficient for being an intentional subject is that something more
is required — say, natural selection or individual training (Millikan 1984;
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Papineau 1987; Dretske 1988) — for the attitudes of the subject to have
determinate contents. This is not relevant in the case of the integrated
collectivity, however, since the contents of its judgments and intentions will
inherit determinacy from the presumptively determinate words that are used by
its members to express those contents.
The usual grounds for driving a wedge between functionally behaving
like an intentional subject and actually being an intentional subject are unlikely,
as this quick survey shows, to cause a problem with the integrated collectivity. If
further grounds for making such a separation between appearance and reality
are lacking, then we have every reason to treat the integrated collectivity as an
intentional subject. And such grounds, so far as I can see, are indeed lacking. I
can think of only one other consideration that might be invoked against counting
integrated collectivities as intentional subjects and it does not raise a serious
problem.
The consideration is that if we treat integrated collectivities as intentional
subjects, then we  may be involved in a sort of double-counting. We will be
counting the individual members of the collectivity as intentional subjects. And
then we will be going on to say that apart from those members, there is a further
subject present too: the collectivity that they compose. But I do not think that this
makes for an objection. The integrated collectivity will not be distinct from its
individual members, in the sense that it will not be capable of existing in the
absence of such members. But it will be distinct in the sense of being a centre for
the formation of attitudes that are capable of being quite discontinuous from the
attitudes of the members. This is one of the lessons of the discursive dilemma.
Consider the case of the worker-owners who have to decide on whether to
forego a pay-rise in order to purchase a device for guarding against the danger of
electrocution. Imagine that they cast their votes after the pattern illustrated in
Matrix 4 and that they follow the premise-centred procedure in determining
what to think about the issue. In such a case the group will form a judgment on
the question of the pay-sacrifice which is directly in conflict with the unanimous
vote of its members. It will form a judgment that is in the starkest possible
discontinuity with the corresponding judgments of its members.
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As the point applies to judgment, so it naturally extends to intention. The
collectivity of workers that makes a judgment in favour of the pay-sacrifice will
be firmly disposed to act accordingly, under the procedure it adopts, and in that
sense it will form a corresponding intention. Thus the chairperson will be
entitled by the premise-driven procedure to announce on the basis of the
premise-votes: ‘Colleagues, our intention is fixed: we will forego the pay-rise’.
But at the moment where the intention of the integrated group is thereby fixed,
no one member will intend that the group act in that way, or that he or she play
their part in the group’s acting in that way. Such individual intentions will
follow on the formation of the group intention, of course, since the group can
only act through the actions of its members. But they are not the stuff out of
which the group intention is constructed; on the contrary, they are effects that the
formation of the group intention plays a role in bringing about.
These discontinuities between collective judgments and intentions, on the
one hand, and the judgments and intentions of members, on the other, make
vivid the sense in which a social integrate is an intentional subject that is distinct
from its members. They represent the cost that must be paid if a collectivity is to
achieve the rational unity that we expect in any intentional subject. Rational
unity is a constraint that binds the attitudes of the collectivity at any time and
across different times, and the satisfaction of that constraint means that those
attitudes cannot be smoothly continuous with the corresponding attitudes of
members.
In arguing that a social integrate is an intentional subject that is distinct
from its members — that exists over and beyond its members — I hasten to add
that I am not postulating any ontological mystery. The argument is consistent
with the supervenience claim that if we replicate how things are with and
between individuals in a collectivity — in particular, replicate their individual
judgments and their individual dispositions to accept a certain procedure — then
we will replicate all the collective judgments and intentions that the group
makes. Collective judgments and intentions may be discontinuous with what
happens at the individual level but they cannot vary independently of what
happens there; they do not constitute an ontologically emergent realm.3
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5. Social integrates are institutional persons
This discontinuity between an integrated collectivity and its members, and
the fact that such a collectivity can constitute a distinct intentional subject, is
quite surprising. But there is more to come. For it turns out that the way in which
the judgments and intentions of social integrates are formed and policed forces
us to think of those collectivities as institutional persons. It leads us to see that
like individual human beings, and unlike non-human animals, they display
everything that is strictly necessary in personal as distinct from just intentional
subjects.
What distinguishes personal from merely intentional subjects? As I
assumed in the previous discussion that intentional subjects have to display a
certain ratonal unity, so I make a parallel assumption in discussing this question.
I assume that whereas intentional subjects must have intentional states and
perform associated actions in a way that satisfies rational unity — whether or not
they are aware of doing so — persons must be capable of being held to that ideal;
they must be such that they can be held responsible for failures to unify their
intentional states and actions in a rational way (Rovane 1987; Pettit 2001a, Ch. 4).
Rational unity is a constraint that intentional systems must be designed to fulfill,
if only at subpersonal, unconscious levels. Rational unification is a project for
which persons must be taken to assume responsibility, at least on a case by case
basis.
The commitment that persons make to rational unification, according to
this account, means that persons don’t just possess intentional states, and
perform corresponding actions. They also avow those states and actions,
acknowledging them as their own. And, avowing them, they hold themselves
open to criticism in the event of not proving to live up to them: not proving to
satisfy rational unity in their regard. Let a person avow a belief that p and a
belief that if p then q, for example, and we can expect them to form and avow the
belief that q. Or if they fail to do so, then we can expect them to have a
justification or an excuse to offer. The justification may be that they had a change
of mind in respect of ‘p’ or ‘if p then q’, the excuse that the conditions under
which they were operating made it difficult to think straight.
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The assumption that persons are marked off from ordinary intentional
subjects — say, non-human animals — by the commitment to rational unification
makes for a rich conception of personhood. But for that very reason it will hardly
be contested in the present context, for the richness of the account should make it
harder rather than easier to argue that integrations of people count as persons. In
any case I will say nothing more in its defence here. I shall take as persons those
intentional agents who can avow their intentional states and the actions they
perform in words — or in signs of some other sort — and who can then be held
to the associated expectations. We may describe as persons those human beings
who do not yet have this capacity, who no longer have it, or who do not have it
at all. But that usage is readily seen as an extension based on the fact that they
are of a kind — that is, of a species — with creatures who are persons in that
strict sense.
Assuming that persons are intentional agents who make and can be held
to avowals, what are we to say of integrated groups? I have no hesitation in
arguing that this means that they are institutional persons, not just institutional
subjects or agents (Rovane 1997 argues a similar line). Integrated collectivities
bind themselves to the discipline of reason at the collective level, and that means
that they are open to criticism in the event of not achieving rational unity in
relevant regards. They avow judgments, intentions and actions and prove able to
be held responsible for failures to achieve consistency and other such ideals in
their associated performance. They are subjects which can be treated as properly
conversable interlocutors (Pettit and Smith 1996).
Social integrates contrast in this respect with any groups that do not
impose the discipline of reason at the collective level. Collectivities of this
aggregate  kind will not be answerable in the same way to words previously
authorised or deeds previously performed. And that will be so, no matter how
tight we make the mutual-awareness constraints on when they can be said to
authorise words or perform deeds. It will always be possible for such an
aggregate to vote in favour of a judgment or an intention or an action that is out
of kilter with earlier commitments, and to do so without being exposed to
legitimate criticism. Opinion poll research may tell us that the populace as a
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whole supports cutting taxes, increasing defence expenditure and also increasing
other expenditure. Since all the individuals involved may hold consistent views,
that finding that will not give us reason to criticise the populace for holding such
opinions, as we might criticise a political party for doing so. For even if it is taken
as an intentional subject, the populace cannot be expected to police itself for the
rational unity of the things it believes and then be held to that expectation. It
does not constitute a person in the relevant sense and it contrasts in that regard
with the political party.
Whenever we speak of persons we think it is appropriate to speak of
selves. We expect that persons will think of themselves in the first person and be
able to self-ascribe beliefs and desires and actions by the use of an indexical
expression like ‘I’ or ‘my’, ‘me’ or ‘mine’. This association between being a
person and thinking in self-ascriptive terms is borne out under the
characterisation of persons adopted here. If a person is to avow certain states and
actions, and assume responsibility for achieving rational unity in their regard,
then those states and actions are bound to have a distinctive salience in their
experience. Individual subjects are bound to see them — by contrast with the
states and actions of others — as matters of what I believe, what I desire, what I
do, and so on (Pettit 2001a, Ch.4).
Why must the personal point of view have this indexical, first-personal
character? Why must I as a conversable subject be aware of myself in this
indexical way, rather than just under a name, say as PP? A well-known line of
argument provides the answer (Perry 1979; Burge 1998). Were I to conceive of
myself under a name, as PP, then there would always be a deliberative gap
between my thinking that PP believes both that p and that ‘p’ entails ‘q’ and my
actually adjusting beliefs — say, in response to conversational challenge — by
coming to believe that q or by giving up one of the other beliefs. For why should
my beliefs about PP’s beliefs have any reason-mediated effect on what I believe
and assert, short of my believing that I am PP? And if I can think that I am PP, of
course, then I do think of myself in the first person, not just under a name.
So far as integrated collectivities operate on the same lines as individual
persons, they will also have this capacity to think in first person terms. From the
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standpoint of those in an integrated collectivity the words defended in the past,
for example, will stand out from any words emanating from elsewhere as words
that bind and commit them. Specifically, they will stand out for those of us in the
collectivity as words that ‘we’ as a plural subject maintain. The argument in the
singular case for why I as a person must conceive of my attitudes as matters of
what I think applies in the plural case too, showing that we, the members of an
integrated collectivity, must think of the group’s attitudes as matters of what we
think.
The members of a social integrate, S, will face the same deliberative gap as
that which appeared in the singular case, if they conceive of the existing
commitments of the group just as those that holds. Suppose that we in that group
recognise both that p and that the truth of ‘p’ entails the truth of ‘q’. That will not
lead us as a group to judge that q, unless we make the extra judgment that we
are S. And if we do make that judgment then of course we do think of ourselves
in the first person plural. As members of the integrated group, we are possessed
of a personal point of view and it is marked out by this indexical usage.
The emphasis on the importance of ‘we’ connects with the insistence by
writers like Margaret Gilbert (1989), John Searle (1995) and Annette Baier
(1997)that there is no possibility of analysing we-talk in I-talk, or indeed in
impersonal talk of what named individuals do (see too Tuomela 1995, 183). The
obstacle to reducing talk of ‘we’ to talk of ‘I’ will be just the obstacle that stands
in the way of reducing indexical talk of what I think and do to non-indexical talk
of what PP thinks and does. As there is a personal perspective that is available
only with talk of ‘I’, so there is a personal perspective that becomes available
only with talk of ‘we’.
The autonomy of ‘we’ talk that has to obtain under our account of what it
is for a collectivity to be integrated nicely emphasises the significance of the
claim that such collectivities are personal as well as intentional agents. Not only
do social integrates have a rational unity that constrains their performance over
time and that makes them distinct from their own members. The rational unity
they display is one that they themselves police and implement in the fashion of
creatures whom we can hold responsible: creatures who count as persons
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(McGeer and Pettit 2001). They are rationally unifying as well as rationally
unified subjects and the enterprise of unification in which they are involved
forces them to think in the manner of a self. It makes it natural and indispensable
for members to resort to a distinctively proprietary use of ‘we’, us’ and ‘ours’.
Once again, I should say, there is no ontological mystery in any of this: no
suggestion of reality sundering into distinct realms, for example, indexical and
non-indexical. If we fix the way the world is in impersonal, non-indexical terms,
then we will have fixed all the indexical truths — in particular all the I-truths and
all the we-truths — as well. Indexical truths supervene on non-indexical, since
the same indexical sentences will be true at the same locations of utterance in
impersonally indiscernible worlds (Jackson 1998; Pettit 2000). But this sort of
fixing — this ontological reducibility — is quite consistent with the perspective
of non-indexical talk failing to register things in the way required for singular
conversability, and indeed with the perspective of I-talk failing to register things
in the way required for plural conversability. Such idioms may fail to be
intertranslatable, and yet not direct us to independent realms of reality.
6. Natural and institutional persons
The claim just defended is that social integrates have to be regarded as
persons, on a par with individual human beings. But it is consistent, of course,
with acknowledging that such institutional persons differ from natural persons
in as many ways as they resemble them. As we saw earlier, institutional persons
are not centres of perception or memory or sentience, or even of degrees of belief
and desire. Institutional persons form their collective minds only on a restricted
range of matters, to do with whatever purpose they are organised to advance.
And institutional persons are artificial creatures whose responses may be
governed by reason, not in the spontaneous manner that is characteristic of
individual human beings, but only in a painstaking fashion. Their reasoning may
be as tortuous as that of the impaired human being who has to work out
reflectively, case by case, that in virtue of believing that p and that if p then q, he
or she ought also to believe that q. Integrated collectivities are persons in virtue
of being conversable and responsible centres of judgment, intention and action.
But they are persons of a bloodless, bounded and crudely robotic variety.
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Even granted this, however, there are still important questions as to how
institutional and natural persons relate to one another; in particular, how
institutional persons and the members who constitute them relate to one another.
I address two such questions in this brief conclusion.
The first is a more or less straightforward question as to the institutional
profiles that members have to assume so far as they constitute a single collective
person. Throughout this paper I have been assuming that even if just one
individual has to act on behalf of a collective, the members are all equal
participants in the formation of the collective’s judgments and intentions, having
equal voting power with others. But this is unrealistic as an assumption about
most real-world collectives, and the first question is how far membership is
consistent with the absence of such voting power.
There are two ways in which individuals may be said to endorse a
collective procedure or outcome. First, by actively voting in its favour; and
second, by having a capacity for exit or contestation or something of the kind —
this, as a matter of common awareness — but not exercising that power.
Although active voting is the most obvious mode of endorsement, it must also be
possible for people to endorse a collective pattern in the second, virtual mode.
The members of a collectivity cannot vote on every procedure that they are to
follow, on pain of infinite regress; the problem is akin to that which would be
involved in trying to endorse as an explicit premise every principle of inference
deployed in an argument (Carroll 1895). If regress is to be avoided, therefore,
then some of the procedures followed by the members of a collectivity must be
followed without the endorsement of an explicit vote and just on the basis that
that is how things are done among members, and done without contestation.
But if all the members of a group must endorse some procedures in a
virtual way — that is, by not exercising a power of exit or contestation or
whatever — then it is clearly possible that on many matters of procedure, and on
many outcomes, some members will play an active voting part, while others are
involved only in that virtual manner. And this is how it is, obviously, with most
integrated collectivities. Such collectivities sometimes involve all of their
members in deliberation on every decision. But more often they stage their
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decisions so that the full assembly only votes on general matters, delegating
others to smaller bodies and to officers of the group. Or they may involve a
membership that is largely passive, with most being involved in official decisions
only to the extent of needing to be pacified. Or they may be articulated into
subunits that are each passive in relation to one another. And so on: the details
need not concern us.
The second question raised by our discussion bears on how natural and
institutional persons relate to one another within the psychology of a given
member. Suppose that someone is faced with a decision on which they as a
natural person tend to go one way, while an institutional person of which they
are a member — perhaps the relevant, executive member — would tend to go
another. What is to happen in such a case? For all that we have said, it might be
that the psychology of the individual is taken over, willy nilly, either by the
natural person associated with it or by the institutional person. Or it might be
that which person is to be present in that psychology is determined, at least
ideally, by considerations that the two persons can debate — debate within the
same head, as it were — and reach agreement on. Or it might be that the natural
person is always primary and has the task of deciding whether to act in their
own name — in their own interests, perhaps, or according to their own values —
or in the name of the collective. The first model is clearly crazy, suggesting that
persons take over psychologies in the way demons are said to assume possession
of souls. But which of the other two models is the more plausible?
My own inclination is to go for the last alternative, giving priority to
natural persons. I reject the picture according to which persons, natural and
institutional, are of more or less the same standing and have equal presumptive
claims in the sort of case envisaged on the resources of the member’s psychology
(Rovane 1997 supports this image). I hold that natural persons have an
inescapable priority and that in this kind of case it will be up to the natural
person to decide whether or not to cede place to the institutional, acting in
furtherance of the collective goal and in neglect of his or her own priorities.
There are a couple of reasons why I hold by this image rather than the
other. One is that it fits well with the intentional manner in which, as it seems,
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natural persons go about constituting and enacting institutional agents. Natural
persons are in intentional control of whether they enter or exit most of the
collectives to which they belong. And when they act on behalf of a collective they
are reinforced in their identity as natural persons, and the intentional control
they have as natural persons, by the way others relate to them; others call on
Jones to do what the collective requires of them, others congratulate Jones for
doing his or her bit, and so on.
Another reason for preferring my model is that there are cases where it is
going to be quite misleading to think of two persons, one natural and the other
institutional, debating within a single head as to who should be the one to
prevail. That model may apply when the reasons that they take into account are
agent-neutral considerations to do with what is for the best overall but it will be
unrealistic where each person has an agent-relative reason — say, one to do with
personal prospects or commitments or allegiances — for wanting to go their
preferred way. When ordinary people diverge in that way, then reason runs out
and they may have to compete in some non-deliberative manner — or toss a coin
— to determine who wins. We cannot envisage a natural and an institutional
person competing in that way within the same head.4
It is sometimes said that before we know what it is rational for a human
being to do, we need to be told which identity that agent is enacting; in particular
we need to be told whether they are acting in their own name or the name of a
collectivity (Hurley 1989). Thus Elizabeth Anderson (2000) defends ‘The Priority
of Identity to Rational Principle: what principle of choice it is rational to act on
depends on a prior determination of personal identity, of who one is’. The line
just taken suggests that this is not so. The natural person is the ultimate centre of
action and if it is rational for a human being to act in the name of a collectivity —
that is, rational in the sense of maximising relevant preferences — then it is
rational in terms of the natural person’s preferences.
Conclusion
In maintaining points of the kind defended in this paper, we make contact
with the tradition that the nineteenth century German historian, Otto von Gierke,
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sought to track and to revitalise: the tradition of emphasising the institutional
personality of many groups and the significance of such personality for legal,
political and social theory (Hager 1989; Runciman 1997; McLean 1999). This
tradition is deeply organicist in its imagery, and led adherents to speak for
example of ‘the pulsation of a common purpose which surges, as it were, from
above, into the mind and behaviour of members of any true group’ (Barker 1950,
61). But the organic, often overblown metaphors should not be allowed to
discredit the tradition. The points they were designed to emphasise are perfectly
sensible observations of the kind that our analysis of integrated groups supports.
I have argued elsewhere that consistently with being individualistic about
the relation between human beings and the social regularities under which they
operate — consistently with thinking that social regularities do not compromise
individual agency — we may oppose the atomism that insists on the coherence
of the solitary thinker; we may argue that individuals depend non-causally on
one another for having the capacity to think (Pettit 1993). What we have seen in
this paper is that consistently with being individualistic we may also oppose the
singularism that insists on the primacy of the isolated agent and claims that we
can describe collectivities as persons only in a secondary sense.
Individualism insists on the supervenience claim that if we replicate how
things are with and between individuals, then we will replicate all the social
realities that obtain in their midst: there are no social properties or powers that
will be left out (Macdonald and Pettit 1981; Currie 1984; Pettit 1993). But this
insistence on the supervenience of the social in relation to the individual is quite
consistent with emphasising that the entities which individuals compose can
assume a life of their own, deserving the attribution of discontinuous judgments
and intentions and displaying all the qualities expected in personal agents.
The world of living organisms did not cease to be interesting when
scientists dismissed the conceit of a vis vitalis. And neither should the world of
social groups cease to be interesting, just because we choose to exorcise the
spectre of a vis socialis. On the contrary, the recognition that the realm of
collectivities is an artefact of human hands should excite the sociological, the
political and the historical imagination. The sociological, because we badly need
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general models of how collectivities can be created and sustained (Coleman
1974). The political, because we need to develop criteria for assessing the
performance of collectivities and proposals for containing their power (Hager
1989). And the historical, because we have only the sketchiest understanding of
how the most important collectivities in our lives emerged and stabilised as
integrated agents (Skinner 1989).5
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1 The structure involved is this:
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a. there is a conclusion to be decided among the judges by reference to a
conjunction of independent or separable premises — the conclusion will be
endorsed if relevant premises are endorsed, and otherwise it will be rejected;
b. each judge forms a judgment on each of the premises and a corresponding
judgment on the conclusion;
c. each of the premises is supported by a majority of judges but those majorities do
not coincide with one another;
d. the intersection of those majorities will support the conclusion, and the others
reject it, in view of a; and
e. the intersection of the majorities is not itself a majority; in our examples only one
judge out of the three is in that intersection.
2 Let the views of certain individuals on a rationally connected set of issues be
rationally satisfactory in the sense of being consistent, complete and deductively
closed. The impossibility theorem shows that any procedure whereby an equally
satisfactory set of views may be derived from the individual views must fail in one of
the following regards. It must be incapable of working with some profiles of
individual view. Or it must fail to treat some individual or some issue even-
handedly: roughly, it must let some individual or individuals be treated as less
important than another — at the limit, the other may be given the status of a dictator
— or it must downgrade some issue in the sense of letting the collective view on that
issue be determined, not by majority vote, by the collective views on other issues.
3 There are other ontological questions that I do not address here. One is the issue
of whether a group at any time is constituted in some sense by the individuals
involved or is identical with the fusion of those individuals. This parallels the
familiar sort of question raised about whether a statue is constituted by the body
of clay used in its manufacture or whether it is identical with that body of clay.
Different positions may be taken on this question, consistently with the claims
made in the text.
4 This line of thought might be blocked by a consequentialist argument to the
effect that all such divergences have to be judged ultimately by reference to
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agent-neutral considerations. But it would be strange to tie one’s view of the
relationship between natural and institutional persons to a consequentialist
commitment. And in any case it is possible for consequentialists to argue that it is
often best for people — best in agent-neutral terms — to think and even compete
in agent-relative ways.
5 I was greatly helped in developing this paper by conversations with Chandran
Kukathas, Christian List and Victoria McGeer, as well as by comments from two
anonymous referees. I am indebted to the discussion it received at a number of
venues: the Summer Institute on ‘Social Ontology after The Common Mind’, held in
Erasmus University, Rotterdam, July 2000, where my commentators were Ron
Mallon and Rafal Wierzschoslawski; and at seminars in Columbia and Yale. I am also
grateful for a useful set of comments from Elizabeth Anderson and for discussions of
the priority of identity principle with Akeel Bilgrami and Carol Rovane.
